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THE ECONOMICS OF TIIlRD WORLD DEFENSE 
EXPENDITURES: A SURVEY OF RECENT 
FINDINGS ON THE CONTRASTING PATTERNS 
OF IMPACT AND DETERMINANTS 
By Robert E. Looney* 
INTRODUCTION 
A body of conventional wisdom has amassed over the 
years concerning the causes and consequences of Third World 
militarization.I More often than not in assessing the likely 
impacts of defense expenditures this wisdom has been anecdo-
tal and biased towards the standing "guns versus butter" 
analogies. Similarly, strategic-political variables and explana-
tions such as external threats, alliances, and regional arms 
races have been the standard explanations for the level of 
Third World military spending and arms imports. Finally, 
independence of major suppliers, emulation of neighbors and 
fear of arms boycotts have dominated the discussion as to why 
Third World countries are increasingly turning to indigenous 
arms production. 
The main purpose of this paper is to indicate the manner in 
which recent empirical studies of different sub-groupings of devel-
oping countries2 have extended several areas of knowledge regard-
ing various aspects of Third World militarization. In particular, we 
are interested in determining in what manner and to what extent 
this recent quantitative research challenges conventional wisdom. 
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THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE 
EXPENDITURES ON GROWTH 
Since the modern defense establishment is a heavy con-
sumer of technical and managerial manpower and foreign 
exchange, resources that are especially scarce in the Third 
World, the conventional wisdom is that increased defense bor-
ders should reduce the overall rate of growth.a 
This proposition was first empirically challenged by 
Emile Benoit.4 Benoit's rationale for a possible positive link 
between defense and growth was, however, never widely 
accepted. It took nearly ten years for Charles Wolf's analysis to 
provide intellectual respectability to the proposition that by 
creating a more stable environment it was very possible in cer-
tain cases or situations for added defense expenditures to stim-
ulate higher rates of investment, technological progress, tech-
nology transfer and hence increased overall growth. 5 
Studies using large samples of developing countries 
have often lent weak support to the conventional theories. 6 
However, research examining the economic impact of Third 
World military expenditures utilizing various sub-groupings of 
countries have tended to confirm Wolf's prognosis. 
This research has been largely undertaken at the Naval 
Post-graduate School.7 It has gone through various stages and 
levels of sophistication with the initial studies largely confined 
to ordinary least squares regression techniques utilizing 
Benoit's data set for the 1950-65 period. 
In the original study, countries were grouped on the 
basis of discriminate analysis with savings and investment 
used as discriminating variables. Frederiksen and Looney 
found countries with relatively high levels of savings and 
investment experienced positive impacts on growth, while the 
impact was statistically insignificant for countries experienc-
ing low levels of savings and investment. 
A second study also used Benoit's sample countries.8 In 
this paper, however, countries were grouped largely on the 
basis of: (a) foreign exchange earnings, (b) import elasticity, 
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and (c) productivity of investment. Again, countries relatively 
unconstrained experienced positive impacts on growth stem-
ming from defense expenditures, while the relatively foreign 
exchange constrained countries showed a statistically insignifi-
cant but negative impact. 
Using a later time period, 1965-73,9 and again grouping 
developing countries on the basis of their relative savings and 
investment, Frederiksen and Looney found that the relatively 
unconstrained countries enjoyed a positive impact stemming 
from defense expenditures. It should be noted here that these 
initial studies examined only the impact of defense expendi-
tures on growth. 
More recently, analysis in the area has become more 
sophisticated, utilizing either more elaborate statistical devices 
and/or subtle country groupings. For example, the studies 
examining the effects of relative resource constraintlO repre-
sent a more elaborate variant of earlier themes in that they 
used factor analysis for selecting variables for a subsequent 
discriminate analysis. As before, analysis produced two groups 
of Third World countries. This time the grouping was based on 
total access to foreign resources--exports, external borrowing 
and the like. Again, countries with abundant foreign exchange 
derived positive impacts on growth from military expenditures 
while that group of countries experiencing foreign exchange 
shortages found growth unaffected by military spending. 
Dividing Third World countries on the basis of their 
indigenous production (or lack of) of at least one major 
weapons system,11 it appears that for the 1970-82 period, 
Third World military producers experienced positive impacts 
from military expenditures on growth, investment, savings, 
but declines in productivity, while non-producers experienced 
declines in growth and investment. 
Groupings of Third World countries on the basis of 
regime type (military or civilian) also produced similar results 
with military regimesl2 obtaining positive impacts from mili-
tary expenditures. The same patternl3 emerged when coun-
tries were grouped on the basis of the legitimacy of govern-
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ment (and threat faced by the regime from internal or external 
sources). 
In recent years, analysis has branched into more com-
plex issues, utilizing both time series14 and simultaneous 
equation models estimated by two and three stage squares 
regression techniques. This research is attempting to incorpo-
rate the demand for military expenditures along with their 
impacts in an attempt to determine feed backs from one to the 
other. 
Interestingly enough the results15 produced by these 
techniques tend to confirm the results obtained from simpler, 
more naive models. 
In short, the research summarized above demonstrates 
a consistent pattern whereby certain groups of Third World 
countries-usually the more successful economically, the most 
stable politically, or those engaged in military production 
derive positive impacts form military spending. Those coun-
tries less successful economically, more politically unstable or 
lacking a domestic arms industry fail to derive any positive 
economic impacts from defense expenditures. However, it is 
important to note that defense expenditures may also be asso-
ciated with a number of adverse effects. This is the case even 
in those countries experiencing higher overall rates of growth 
from increased allocations to defense. In particular, countries 
with an indigenous arms industry may suffer a deterioration 
in the distribution of income from added defense 
expenditures.16 The same may also occur in military regimes 
as income is shifted by the government from urban consumers 
to industrial groups.17 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND 
MILITARY REGIMES 
A second area of conventional wisdom concerns the eco-
nomic behavior and socio-economic priorities of Third World 
military regimes. Here the general stereotype of modern Third 
World military regimes is ultra-conservatism combined with 
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military force to dismantle organizations of popular expres-
sion, restrain real wages, promote integration into world trade 
and financial markets, and to hold down social reform as well 
as mass consumption in the interest of favoring capital accu-
mulation and upper class income.18 
Everything else equal, conventional wisdom holds that 
Third World military regimes will have a higher defense bur-
den (in terms of the percentage of Gross National Product 
(GNP) allocated to defense) and a larger share of the central 
government budget allocated to defense than in the c?~e of 
their civilian counterparts. It turns out, however that military 
and civilian regimes tend to have a number of superficial simi-
larities with regard to defense allocation-similar military bur-
dens, armed forces per capita, and the share of the budg~t allo-
cated to defense. These similarities extend to the determmants 
of military expenditures per capita and the military burden. 
That is, both regime types exhibit a fairly similar linkage 
between the share of the budget allocated to defense and the 
tax burden. 
If civilian and military regimes differ with regard to 
defense expenditures, it must be in the timing and m~er in 
which military expenditure decisions are made and m the 
means through which resources are mobilized for defense 
uses.19 This may in tum affect the economic impacts associat-
ed with military expenditures in both types of regimes:20 
1. 
2. 
While it appears that higher levels of defense21 expendi-
tures tend to increase economic growth in military 
regimes, civilian regimes experience reduced growth 
with added allocations to defense. 
In terms of the impact of military expenditures, several 
significant differences exist between military and civil-
ian regimes: (a) Civilian regimes suffer reduced levels of human 
capital attainment with increased levels. o~ total 
military expenditure whereas no statistically 
significant relationship is present in the case of 





Civilian regimes increase public expenditures 
per capita and military expenditures as a share 
of GNP simultaneously with increased alloca-
tions to defense. In this regard, military regimes 
show no apparent pattern.23 
Military regimes experienced higher levels of 
nutrition with increased levels of military expen-
diture, whereas their civilian counterparts expe-
rienced reductions (not statistically significant) 
in nutritional levels with added military expen-
ditures24 and 
Military regimes tend to increase the number of 
physicians per capita and teachers per school 
age population with added military expendi-
tures, while there is no apparent relationship in 
the case of civilian regimes.25 
In short, of the four major measures of the quality of 
life, military regimes experience improvement in two with 
added military expenditures and no declines in the other two. 
On the other hand, their civilian counterparts experience 
reduced levels of human capital, population per professional 
and perhaps nutrition with increased levels of military expen-
ditures. 
In part it is likely that a good proportion of these differ-
ences stems from differences in the budgetary priorities of mil-
itary and civilian regimes: 
1. Civilian regimes appear much less likely to reduce 
social programs during periods of expanded defense 
expenditures than their military counterparts. In fact 
civilian regimes tend to increase a number of social pro-
grams-total social expenditures and welfare expendi-
tures are both expanded in line with defense. These 
expanded budgetary shares tend to come at the expense 
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agricultural development.26 
Since economic allocations tend to bear the brunt of 
expanded military budgets under civilian rule, 
increased military spending is likely to infringe on 
growth inducing allocations and hence ultimately 
growth itself. 
In contrast, the military regimes, perhaps because they 
are not as constrained by civilian opinion and prefer-
ences, tend to be less inclined to maintain social pro-
grams during periods of military build-up. This in turn 
allows them the luxury of avoiding major cuts in eco-
nomic allocations (and perhaps to expand in some eco-
nomic areas). Apparently, one aspect of this budgetary 
pattern is the avoidance of cut backs (and perhaps even 
expansion) in growth inducing allocations during peri-
ods of military build up. 
Explaining the observed higher (relative to civilian 
regimes) levels of basic needs attainment with increased 
defense expenditures in military regimes is more difficult. 
One factor that may be partially responsible for this 
phenomenon is the different patterns of external borrowing 
observed for civilian and military regimes. It appears27 that 
military regimes have financed a considerable part of their 
defense expenditures through external borrowing. Civilian 
regimes on the other hand show no statistically significant 
relationship between military expenditures and public exter-
nal debt. 
Because of the positive impact military expenditures 
may have on growth in military regimes, budget allocations 
can be made in an expanding sum environment i.e. there can 
be increases in defense and in quality of life enhancing activi-
ties. 
Clearly, military regimes are unlikely to experience only 
expanding sum situations associated with increases in military 
expenditures. Some groups and/or sectors in these countries 
are likely to suffer declines in their standard of living, particu-
225 
JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES 
larly during periods of increased defense allocations. After 
examining a number of links with the Civilian sector - agri-
cultural growth, employment and so on, it appears tha't 
defense expenditures are largely supported by reductions in 
personal consumption in the military regimes. Again this fact 
implies that increased growth stemming from military expen-
ditures comes about in a manner that may significantly skew 
income distribution towards increased inequality.28 
Perhaps because of their authoritarian nature, military 
regimes, through controlling organized labor groups and thus 
wages, are able to control private consumption to an extent not 
possible in civilian democratic regimes-. This process undoubt-
edly frees up additional resources for both investment and 
defense activities. 
The fact that public consumption in military regimes is 
more closely linked to government revenues than is the case in 
civilian regimes also indicates the degree of relative control 
over the economy possessed by these governments. 
Several other diff erences29 between military and civil-
ian regimes may contribute to the growth, budgetary and qual-
ity oflife patterns outlined above: 
1. Military regimes appear to be in somewhat better con-
trol of military expenditures. That is, relative to civilian 
governments defense allocations in these regimes can 
be timed and phased over time so as to not produce the 
generally adverse economic effects (such as a lowering 
in the share of investment in Gross National Product 
(GNP), increased growth in imports and higher rates of 
inflation) found in civilian regimes. 
2. While both military and civilian regimes experience 
rent seeking behavior, (as reflected in price distortions 
in financial, foreign exchange, and labor markets), dif-
ferent groups seem to be favored in each regime type, 
with civilians favoring urban consumers and military 
regimes favoring industrial groups. 
3. While still conjectural at this point, it appears that mili-
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tary regimes may be able, through shifting income from 
r agriculture to finance defense expenditures, to preserve 
and perhaps increase the level of high saving/high 
investment groups during periods of military build-up. 
This undoubtedly accounts for the increase in savings 
and investment associated with increased military 
expenditures in military regimes (but not civilian). 
4. It follows that civilian regimes, having less control over 
rent seeking groups (and perhaps military pressures for 
additional equipment), do not appear to be able to com-
bine rent seeking activity and military expenditures in 
a manner conducive to overall growth. 
The results summarized for the impact of military 
expenditures in the contrasting political settings may provide 
some insight as to why aggregate studies of Third World 
economies have failed to find significant links between econom-
ic variables and military expenditures. Since the signs of the 
major economic variables affecting military expenditures are 
considerably different depending on whether a country has a 
civilian or military regime, aggregating all countries in a sin-
gle regression tends to blur the impact of the individual eco-
nomic variables. 
DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
AND ARMS IMPORTS 
A Third major area where a long standing conventional 
wisdom prevails ·concerns the underlying factors responsible 
for Third World military expenditures and arms imports. As 
noted above, while some differences in military expenditure 
levels can be accounted for by differences in regime type, the 
bulk of the literature30 in this area stresses external or strate-
gic-political variables as critical in affecting military expendi-
tures. Recent research31 however, indicates that over all expen-
diture constraints may ultimately set the actual range in 
which military expenditures are likely to fall. 
JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES 
Furthermore, examining countries as groups based on 
their regime type, production capabilities, and resource con-
straint, it appears that large differences occur in the manner 
in which economic factors affect military expenditures between 
different sets of countries. 32 
With regard to regime type: 
1. Defense expenditures are not related to overall econom-
ic activity in military regimes.33 This result suggests 
that a greater degree of budgetary flexibility exists in 
military regimes. That is, military regimes may be able 
to respond more rapidly to changes in perceived threat 
than their civilian counterparts. ·In civilian regimes 
there is a close association between military expendi-
tures and gross domestic activity, perhaps indicating a 
sufficient target share of military expenditures in gross 
national product is established to retain support of the 
military. 
2. As a result, public external debt has been highly signifi-
cant in financing (directly or indirectly) defense expen-
ditures in military regimes. Civilian regimes appear 
quite reluctant to go into further debt simply to support 
a higher level of military expenditures34 and or arms 
imports.35 
3. Increases in price distortions were used to mobilize 
resources for military expenditures in the military 
regimes, but these increases had a negative impact on 
the military budget in civilian regimes. 
4. Exports were statistically significant in contributing to 
increased military expenditures in the military regimes, 
but not in the case of civilian regimes. 
In summary, the picture that emerges is one of military 
regimes being committed to developing the size of the defense 
sector to levels not warranted by economic size per se. They 
have done this through extensive use of externally borrowed 
funds. They have utilized increases in foreign exchange earn-
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ings to expand defense allocations and they have distorted 
their price systems in a manner that facilitated increased 
defense expenditures. It is interesting to note that well over 
eighty-five percent of the fluctuations in both military and 
civilian regimes can be accounted for by a limited number of 
economic variables. This fact holds irrespective of perceived 
threats, geographical location, or pressures from arms suppli-
ers-factors often used to explain the level of military expendi-
tures in the Third World. 
In terms of the producers and non-producers, the 
results of a small model linking arms production, resource con-
straints, military expenditures and arms imports,36 demon-
strated that a high proportion of the various measures of 
resources allocated to the military in arms producing countries 
can be accounted for by internal (economic) factors. On the 
other hand, non producer environments are relatively more 
susceptible to external factors. Apparently, the possession of an 
indigenous arms industry results in on-going demands to 
maintain relatively high (and stable) levels of defense expendi-
tures. The governments of non producing countries may not 
face the same political pressures to maintain high levels of 
defense expenditures during periods of low external threat 
simply to maintain employment in defense plants. As a result 
their military budgets tend to be relatively volatile. These pat-
terns are reinforced by the fact that with several exceptions 
hardly any output from Third World defense plants is absorbed 
by external markets. This places great pressure on internal 
sales to sustain efficient levels of production. 
In short, arms producers appear to apply some sort of 
"Military Keynesianism" based on stimulating demand in 
defense plants during deflationary periods.37 Clearly if the 
advanced countries are serious in their concerns over increas-
ing defense burdens in the Third World, one way to reduce the 
level of military expenditures in these countries would be 
through much stricter control of the licensing of arms produc-
tion technology, and the restriction of financial credits to build 
additional plants. 
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In addition, the producing countries appear to finance a 
large part of their military expenditures with external debt 
and therefore are not necessarily shifting domestic resources 
away from productive activities to produce arms. Tighter con-
trols on foreign lending to these countries would undoubtedly 
make arms production somewhat less attractive. 
Resource constrained and unconstrained countries 






Third World countries are not homogenous with regard 
to the factors affecting arms imports, overall military 
expenditures, and arms production. It appears access to 
foreign exchange is the common thread in accounting 
for fundamental differences between the these countries 
with regard to both the production and importation of 
arms. 
Similarly, the use of public external indebtedness to 
finance arms imports does not appear to be universal 
among developing countries. In fact, it is possible that a 
large group of relatively debt-free (debt as a percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product) resource unconstrained 
countries have contained arms imports within the lim-
its imposed by self-financing rather than risk jeopardiz-
ing their overall credit worthiness. 39 
On the other hand, it is possible that a large proportion 
of the debt accumulated by the resource constrained 
group of developing countries has stemmed from mili-
tary expenditures. Apparently, the perceived need to 
expand defense expenditure by this group in the face of 
foreign exchange shortages has resulted in relatively 
high levels of external indebtedness measured either as 
a percentage of exports or GNP for the gro·up as a 
whole.40 
Indigenous arms production in the Third World has 
tended to reduce the importation of arms. Again, how-
ever, the extent of this reduction may vary by country 
5. 
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type with the most significant reductions occurring in 
countries with relatively abundant supplies of foreign 
exchange. 
Finally, it appears that arms imports most likely will 
not reach levels attained in the late 1970s. This is due 
not so much to constraint on the part of suppliers and 
recipients, but more to: (a) lack of foreign exchange in 
many of the Third World countries, and (b) the 
development of indigenous production capabilities on 
the part of others. 
In sum, it is possible once the environment is defined to 
account for a large proportion of military expenditures and 
arms imports by resorting to internal (economic factors). Exter-
nal (threat) factors seem to be marginal in affecting these vari-
ables. 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INDIGENOUS 
ARMS PRODUCTION 
The conventional wisdom as to why some Third World 
countries produce arms while others usually do not emphasizes 
factors such as economies of scale; arms producers are most 
likely to be those countries with the biggest militaries and 
GNPs. Of course there are several "special cases" such as 
Israel, South Africa and Taiwan-countries which for purely 
political reasons find it expedient to be somewhat independent 
of the whims of the major arms suppliers. 
Recent empirical analysis of Third World arms produc-
tion41 tends to put these issues in a somewhat different light: 
1. There is a sharp contrast between the environments in 
which Latin American arms production takes place and 
the conditions in which it is present in the rest of the 
world. 
2. The conditions facilitating Latin American arms pro-
duction seem to have been established largely in the 





1960s, and involved the creation, through export growth 
and external borrowing, of a high import capacity. Pre-
sumably, this import capacity was necessary to facili-
tate the high level of technology transfer, capital equip-
ment, and so on needed to establish an indigenous arms 
industry. 
It should be noted that the only new Latin American 
arms producers between 1969/70 and 1979/80 were 
Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela, all of which were oil 
exporters whose access to foreign exchange was 
enhanced during the period. 
The non-Latin American arms producers appear to be 
highly dependent on a steady infusion of public external 
borrowed funds. Overall export and import performance 
does not appear to be critical in the establishment or 
maintenance of an indigenous arms industry. Instead, 
the ability to finance existing current account deficits 
through publicly guaranteed loans appears critical. It 
follows that the non-Latin American arms industries 
may be less viable than those in Latin America. 
Interestingly enough, for both the Latin American and 
non-Latin American countries, economic size, per capita 
income, military capabilities or associated economies of 
sale in production do not appear to be either a neces-
sary or sufficient condition for undertaking indigenous 
arms production. Instead, access to foreign exchange 
presumably required to facilitate imported inputs-both 
technical and material-for actual arms production 
appear to be the main factors determining whether 
arms production will be established and viable over 
time. 
Foreign exchange availability by and of itself is a multi-
dimensional factor, and not associated with one sp~ific 
index such as export growth or inflows of external bor-
rowed funds. 
The explanation for these results probably stems from 
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the fact that Third World arms producers are not yet complete-
ly self-sufficient in either the technical or material inputs 
required for arms production. Instead, the establishment of an 
indigenous arms industry places high and continuous demands 
on a country's foreign exchange reserves. This fact has a num-
ber of implications for the future: 
1. If the above analysis is correct, there should be no new 
Latin American arms producers in the foreseeable 
future. Given the poor export prospects for most of the 
non-producers, together with their high levels of exter-
nal debt, it is extremely unlikely that any of these coun-
tries will have sufficient surpluses of foreign exchange 
to allocate toward the development of an indigenous 
arms industry. 42 
2. The situation is somewhat less apparent for the non-
Latin American countries, since this group of countries 
continuous access to publicly guaranteed external capi-
tal inflows appears to be critical for the establishment 
and survival of a domestic arms industry. Clearly how-
ever, if the major First World arms producers wanted to 
restrict the spread of new indigenous production to this 
area of the world, denial of credits at past levels would 
be the most efficient way to proceed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results summarized above are suggestive of the 
importance of economic variables in affecting the pattern of 
defense allocations and their impact on Third World 
economies. Perhaps the lack of attention given to economic 
variables in the past stems from the fact that rather weak rela-
tionships exist when these factors are regressed on various 
aspects of militarization in developing countries as a whole. 
This is not the case, however, when Third World countries are 
examined as more homogenous groups. 
Here, at least three major groupings have produced 
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interesting and at times exciting results: (1) Political group-
ings-the civilian/military dichotomy; (2) groupings based on 
industrial structure-the producer/non producer dichotomy; 
and (3) groupings based on relative resource constraint. It 
should be noted here that analysis of military expenditure 
impacts or the determinants of the various facets of military 
expenditures using groupings based on income level (rich ver-
sus poor), or geographic location (Africa versus Latin America) 
does not produce results that are very significant statistically, 
or interesting conceptually. 
In choosing among the three groupings surveyed here, 
it appears that groupings along civili~n/military lines, while 
yielding some useful insights, do not consistently produce 
results with as high a level of statistical significance as those 
obtained on the basis of relative resource constraint or the pro-
ducer non-producer dichotomy. This applies for the various 
impacts of military expenditures as well as those factors affect-
ing arms imports, overall military expenditures, and bud-
getary patterns. 
In choosing between the resource constraint and pro-
ducer/non producer groupings, it appears access to foreign 
exchange is the common thread accounting for fundamental 
differences between the Third World countries with regard to 
both the causes and consequences of military expenditures. 
The most direct approach at capturing this effect is through 
the identification and grouping based on relative resource con-
straint. This fact is borne out by the consistently higher corre-
lation coefficients and the values using the constrained/non-
constrained groupings. 
In this regard it is clear that past forecasts of world mil-
itary expenditures that emphasized arms race dynamics or 
bureaucratic momentum while ignoring resource constraints, 
produced systematically biased results whenever financial 
markets and the level of threat perception moved in opposite 
directions. For example, these models often predict that coun-
tries scale down defense expenditures during periods of rela-
tively low external tensions. The major build up of defense 
r 
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expenditures in the late 1970s and early 1980s in many peace-
ful (albeit increasingly credit worthy) areas of the world, clear-
ly calls this framework into question. 
Given the fact that economic variables appear much 
more adept (and themselves easier to forecast) than political or 
threat type considerations at identifying both the impact and 
the amount of resources allocated to defense, it may be more 
feasible than previously thought to develop models for predict-
ing and monitoring the various aspects of Third World econom-
ic performance associated with changes in military expendi-
tures. The same also extends to anticipating movements in 
military expenditures and arms imports. 
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